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Abstract
It has been suggested that repeated stimuli have shorter subjective duration than novel items, perhaps because of a
reduction in the neural response to repeated presentations of the same object. Five experiments investigated the effects of
repetition on time perception and found further evidence that immediate repetition reduces apparent duration, consistent
with the idea that subjective duration is partly based on neural coding efficiency. In addition, the experiments found (a) no
effect of repetition on the precision of temporal discrimination, (b) that the effects of repetition disappeared when there
was a modest lag between presentations, (c) that, across participants, the size of the repetition effect correlated with
temporal discrimination, and (d) that the effects of repetition suggested by a temporal production task were the opposite of
those suggested by temporal judgments. The theoretical and practical implications of these results are discussed.
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Introduction
The judgment of time is central to many behaviours. Learning
patterns of reinforcement [1], interpreting communication signals
[2,3], and encoding dynamic stimuli [4–7] all rely upon the
accurate representation of temporal information. Despite the
importance of accurate timing, time perception is influenced by
various non-temporal factors, including intensity [8–10], motion
[11–13], and sensory modality [14–16]. These effects have been
interpreted within various theoretical frameworks, including those
which posit some kind of internal pacemaker or counting process
[17–19], attentional models [20,21], and the idea that time
perception is based upon the magnitude or unfolding pattern of
neural activity triggered by a stimulus [22,23]. The current work
examined the effects of stimulus repetition on temporal judgment,
and addressed five empirical questions.
1. Does immediate repetition shorten perceived duration?
Existing data suggest that subjective duration is reduced for
stimuli which have just been encountered. Evidence for this
comes from experiments in which a standard stimulus is
repeated approximately 8–10 times with a single presentation
of a different ‘‘oddball’’ stimulus near the end of the sequence.
The oddball is typically judged to last longer than standard
stimuli of the same physical duration (although the effect may
reverse for very short durations) [24–26]. Similarly, the first
image in a sequence is judged longer than the others when the
stimuli are identical but not when they are different [25], and
the visual persistence of briefly-flashed images is reduced for
repeated items [27]. These results have been taken as evidence
that subjective duration depends on the size of the neural
response to a stimulus [22,25], because repeated stimuli evoke
smaller responses (‘‘repetition suppression’’ [28,29]). The
current experiments provide further data regarding the effects
of repetition on the apparent duration of stimuli lasting several
hundred milliseconds.
2. Does immediate repetition influence the precision of temporal
discrimination? Discrimination involves comparing the current
stimulus with a standard encoded in memory. The subjective
duration of a stimulus depends on its non-temporal properties,
so there may be more noise in the comparison of the current
duration with the memory standard when the two intervals are
demarcated by different visual stimuli, leading to poorer
discrimination. More generally, different theoretical accounts
of time perception posit differing effects of prior exposure on
discrimination accuracy and subjective duration [30,31] but
relevant data are in short supply. In one study, Ulrich et al.
found that the comparison duration was subjectively longer
and the discrimination more precise if the comparison stimulus
was rare than if it was common [30], although it is unclear
whether this is because the common stimuli were presented
more frequently, more recently, or both.
3. How are the effects of repetition influenced by changes in lag?
Previous work suggests that when the repetition lag is several
minutes, prior exposure increases subjective duration – the
opposite of what has been found when repetition is immediate.
For example, Witherspoon and Allan found that briefly
presented words (c. 50 ms) were judged to last longer when
they had recently been read aloud [32]. Similarly, participants
asked to leave a stimulus on-screen for 2.5 seconds waited less
time when the stimuli were studied words than when they were
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novel ones [33]. Temporal production is assumed to have an
inverse relationship to estimated duration, so these data further
suggest that the subjective duration of items encoded a few
minutes previously is greater than that of unstudied stimuli. It is
currently unclear whether the difference between these results
and those obtained with immediate repetition are due to
differences in the lag between presentations or to differences in
the judgment tasks employed by the respective studies.
4. Is the extent to which an observer is influenced by stimulus
repetition related to the accuracy of his or her temporal
discrimination? Although there have been studies of individual
differences in time perception (e.g., [34,35]), differences in
susceptibility to factors which affect subjective duration have
not been much investigated.
5. Do the effects of repetition depend on the temporal judgment
task? Different judgment tasks are often assumed to provide
equivalent measures of the time percept, with well-established
relationships between tasks. It is worth testing this assumption
by using different judgment tasks to gauge the effects of
stimulus repetition on subjective duration [24].
Results
Experiment 1: Temporal discrimination
Participants judged whether the duration of a comparison
stimulus (306–706 ms) was longer or shorter than that of a
standard stimulus (506 ms) (Figure 1A). On repeat trials, the
comparison stimulus was identical to the standard; on novel trials,
the comparison stimulus was a new picture, not previously
encountered. Separate logistic functions were fit to the data from
each participant and used to estimate the point of subjective
equality (PSE: the comparison duration judged equal to the
standard) and the difference limen (DL: a measure of the precision
of temporal discrimination). Larger PSE values indicate shorter
subjective durations for the comparison stimulus; larger DL values
indicate poorer temporal discrimination.
The PSE was larger in the repetition condition than in the novel
condition, t(13) = 3.05, p= .009 (Figure 1B). Thus, subjective
duration was shorter for repeated items than for novel ones.
Stimulus repetition had no appreciable effect on the difference
limen, t(13) = .01, p= .99. That is, there was no effect of repetition
on the precision of temporal discrimination.
Experiment 2: Delayed repetitions
Experiment 2 was like Experiment 1 but introduced a delayed
repetition condition in which the comparison image had served as
the standard 21 trials previously, so that 20 trials and 42 images
intervened between the two presentations of the picture. (The
length of the inter-presentation interval depended on the
participant’s response times; average intervals ranged from 63.3–
89.2 s, mean 74.9 , SD=6.9 s).
The results are shown in Figure 2. The point of subjective
equality depended on the experimental condition, F(1.42,
27.02) = 12.66, p,.001, g2p = .40 (Huynh-Feldt correction applied);
immediate repeats seemed shorter than both delayed repeats and
novel images, which did not differ (Bonferroni-corrected ps = .005,
.003, and 1.000 respectively). The difference limen was unaffected
by condition, F(2,38) = 2.63, p= .085, g2p = .12.
Including data from both Experiments 1 and 2 in a single
ANOVA indicated neither a main effect of experiment nor any
interaction between experiment and condition (all Fs,1).
Collapsing over experiment replicated the pattern from the
individual experiments: the subjective durations of novel stimuli
were longer than those of immediate repeats, t(33) = 4.83, p,.001,
but the difference limens were unaffected by repetition, t(33) = .73,
p= .469. In this analysis, the power to detect a ‘‘medium’’ effect
(d = 0.5) in the difference limens is approximately 81% [36].
Across participants, the extent to which stimulus repetition
influenced subjective duration was related to the fidelity of
temporal discrimination. For each participant, overall temporal
discrimination was indexed by averaging the difference limens
across conditions. The size of the effect of repetition on subjective
duration was indexed by subtracting the PSE for immediate
repetitions from the PSE for novel stimuli. The results are plotted
in Figure 2B. In both experiments there is a positive correlation
between difference limen and the magnitude of the repetition
effect (for Experiment 1, r= .65, p= .012, Spearman’s rho= .64,
p= .014; for Experiment 2, r= .64, p= .002, Spearman’s rho= .71,
p,.001). It is clear in Figure 2B that some participants show very
poor discrimination; removing outlying participants with mean
difference limens more than 1.5 interquartile ranges above the
Figure 1. Trial structure and results of Experiment 1. Panel A
shows the events on each trial, which began with a blank screen for
1000 ms. Participants judged whether the second image was shown for
more or less time than the first. On repeat trials, the images were
identical; on novel trials the images were different. Panel B shows the
results. The point of subjective equality (PSE) was greater for repeated
stimuli, indicating shorter subjective duration; repetition produced no
discernible effect on the difference limen (DL), a measure of temporal
discrimination. Error bars show plus/minus one SEM, calculated
separately for each data point. Note that for a within-subject design
such as this, these error bars provide no indication of the significance of
differences between conditions [51].
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0019815.g001
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upper quartile (1 person in Experiment 1, 3 people in Experiment
2) showed that the correlations were not just driven by these
extreme data points (for Experiment 1, r = .86, p,.001, Spear-
man’s rho= .65, p = .017; for Experiment 2, r = .37, p= .142,
rho= .62, p= .008; the t-test and ANOVA results reported above
remained unchanged for these restricted datasets).
Thus, the difference between the subjective duration of repeated
and novel stimuli was greater for participants with poorer
temporal discrimination. This pattern remained when, rather
than averaging the difference limen across conditions, the
correlations were calculated separately using the DLs for
immediate repeats (Experiment 1: r= .58, p= .030, rho= .69,
p= .006; Experiment 2: r= .69, p= .001, rho= .80, p ,.001) and
novel images (Experiment 1: r= .66, p= .010, rho= .46, p= .095;
Experiment 2: r = .65, p = .002, rho= .57, p= .009).
Experiments 3A and 3B: Alternative judgment tasks
Experiments 3A and 3B were similar to Experiments 1 and 2,
but used different judgment tasks. Experiment 3A used category
judgment: the second picture on each trial was shown for 906,
1000 or 1094 ms and participants classified its duration on a scale
ranging from 0.7–1.3 seconds in 0.1 s increments (Figure 3A).
Judged durations increased with physical duration, F(2,42) = 25.69,
p,.001, g2p = .55. More importantly, repeated stimuli were judged
shorter than novel ones, F(1,21) = 5.94, p= .024, g2p = .22; this
effect did not interact with duration, F(2,42) = .67, p= .517,
g2p = .031.
Experiment 3B used temporal production: the second picture
displayed until the participant pressed a button, and participants
sought to leave the picture on-screen for 1 second (Figure 3B).
Mean produced durations were longer for novel stimuli than for
repeats, t(19) = 2.49, p= .022.
Repeated stimuli therefore produced shorter category judg-
ments but also led to shorter mean temporal productions. This is
surprising because temporal estimation and temporal production
are widely believed to be inversely related [37,38,39]. As Brown
(1997, p.1121) explains, for estimation tasks like Experiment 3A:
‘‘If conditions during the interval cause a reduction in the number
Figure 2. Results of Experiment 2. Panel A shows that the
subjective duration was longer (the point of subjective equality was
shorter) for novel images and lagged repeats (Lagged Rep.) than for
immediate repeats (Imm. Rep); lagged repeats and novel images did
not differ. The difference limen (the precision of temporal discrimina-
tion) did not differ between conditions. Panel B shows the positive
across-participant correlation between temporal discrimination and the
size of the repetition effect (the difference between the PSE for
immediate repetitions and the PSE for novel stimuli). The pattern
remained when the outlying participants with very poor discrimination
were excluded. Error bars show plus/minus one SEM, calculated
separately for each data point; these provide no indication of the
significance of differences between conditions.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0019815.g002
Figure 3. Results of Experiments 3A and 3B. Panel A shows the
results of Experiment 3A, which used category judgment. Novel stimuli
were judged to last longer than immediate repeats. Panel B shows the
results of a temporal production task. Productions were longer for the
novel images, which would usually be taken to indicate shorter
subjective duration – in contradistinction to the results from the
category judgment paradigm. The discrepancy between Panels A and B
suggests that temporal production may be a poor index of subjective
duration. Error bars show plus/minus one SEM, calculated separately for
each data point. Again, these provide no indication of the significance
of differences between conditions.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0019815.g003
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of temporal cues perceived, subjects may be biased to judge the
interval as having been relatively short’’ whereas for production
tasks like Experiment 3B: ‘‘If the prevailing task conditions reduce
the number or salience of temporal cues, then the subject may
allow a relatively longer amount of time to pass by before he or she
judged that the interval has elapsed’’ [37]. That is, given that
stimulus repetition led to smaller judgments in Experiment 3A it
would be expected to lengthen productions in Experiment 3B,
contrary to what was found.
Experiment 4: Further investigation of temporal
production
What might underlie the surprising results of Experiments 3A
and 3B? One possibility is that the effect of stimulus repetition on
the rate or salience of temporal cues depends on the observer’s
task. For example, if time perception is based on the accumulation
of pulses from an internal pacemaker then the pacemaker may run
faster for novel items than repeats during discrimination or
category judgment tasks (like Experiments 1–3A) but slower for
novel items during productions tasks like (Experiment 3B). It is
hard to see why pacemaker rate should depend on experimental
task in this way, but the account nonetheless predicts that the effect
of repetition on temporal production will become more pro-
nounced as the to-be-produced duration increases, because the
total number of accumulated pulses depends on the product of the
pacemaker rate and the physical time interval [14,38,40].
In Experiment 4, participants completed a production task
where the target duration was 0.5, 0.75, 1.0, 1.25 or 1.5 seconds,
with one block of 30 trials per duration. As before, participants saw
two pictures on each trial and had to press a button when the
second picture had been on-screen for the specified amount of
time. On half of the trials the two pictures were identical and on
half they were different.
The results are shown in Figure 4. Temporal productions
increased with increasing target duration, F(2.66, 69.03) = 36.09,
p,.001, g2p = .58. More importantly, temporal productions were
shorter for repeated stimuli than for novel ones, F(1,26) = 5.87,
p= .023, g2p = .18, and this effect was independent of target
duration, F(3.42, 88.96) = .50, p= .711, g2p = .02. Thus, there was
no evidence that repetition affected the slope of the production
function in the manner predicted by a change in the rate of an
internal pacemaker. The basis for the longer productions with
novel stimuli is discussed in more detail below.
Experiment 4 also addressed a question posed by the results of
Experiment 2: did delayed repetition have no effect on duration
judgments because participants failed to recognize repeated items?
After completing the production task of Experiment 4, participants
were given a surprise recognition memory test in which they saw a
mixture of novel images and ‘‘Old’’ pictures which had been seen
during the production phase, and had to identify those which had
been seen before. All recognition test images were shown for
506 ms. Old images were stimuli which had been presented as the
first picture of each pair shown on non-repetition trials during the
first 4 blocks of the production task. Each Old picture was
therefore shown for 506 ms and had been seen precisely once for
506 ms at least one block of trials previously, making them similar
to the delayed repetition stimuli in Experiment 2.
For each participant, the proportion of correct responses to Old
pictures and New pictures were used to calculate d’ as a measure
of recognition accuracy. The mean d’ was 1.00 (SD=0.49),
significantly above chance, t(26) = 10.55, p,.001. It is therefore
likely that the delayed repetition stimuli in Experiment 2 would
have been recognized with above-chance accuracy, suggesting a
dissociation between the effects of prior exposure on overt
recognition and the effects on temporal perception.
Discussion
These results suggest several conclusions. First, Experiments 1
and 2 indicate that stimulus repetition reduces subjective duration.
This replicates findings from the oddball paradigm [24–26] in a
task where the participant is not required to judge the comparison
stimulus against a large number of preceding items, and where the
novelty of the item is not confounded with its position in the
stimulus sequence. It accords with the idea that subjective duration
correlates with the size of the evoked neural response [22,25,41],
although the current data do not provide direct evidence of either
the effects of repetition on neural activity or of the correlation
between this activity and subjective time (but see [42]).
Second, the effect of repetition seems to be short-lived. In
Experiment 2 there was no effect of having seen a stimulus a
minute or two previously, despite the finding in Experiment 4 that
participants could readily distinguish delayed repetitions from
novel stimuli in an explicit memory test. Priming effects in other
paradigms also diminish with lag [43], but it is not clear why the
effect of prior exposure on temporal perception disappeared after
only a short inter-stimulus interval filled with approximately 20
intervening images, particularly since previous studies have
demonstrated memory effects on temporal judgment using
comparable delays [32,33,44] – although these studies used
judgment tasks and stimulus types which differ from those of
Experiment 2. The precise time course of repetition effects on
judgments of duration, and the question of whether these effects
diminish over time, over intervening items, or both, will be
important indicators of their neural basis [43].
Third, there was no indication that immediate repetition
influences the precision of temporal discrimination. That is,
repetition shortened subjective duration but had little effect on
Figure 4. Results of Experiment 4. Mean temporal productions
were longer for novel stimuli, which would usually be taken to indicate
shorter subjective duration for these items – contrary to the results of
Experiments 1, 2, and 3A. If the difference between novel stimuli and
repeats reflected a difference in the rate of an internal pacemaker then
the effect would become more pronounced at longer durations. In fact,
the effect of repetition was independent of duration – and inspection of
the figure suggests that, if anything, the difference between conditions
is smaller at longer durations. Error bars show plus/minus one SEM,
calculated separately for each data point. Again, these provide no
indication of the significance of differences between conditions.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0019815.g004
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temporal sensitivity. Ulrich et al. examined the effects of whether a
stimulus was expected or unexpected on temporal perception,
manipulating expectations by presenting some items with high
frequency and others with low frequency [30]. These authors
discuss different possible effects of expectancy, and suggest that the
pattern found in the current experiment would arise if expected
(repeated) stimuli are processed especially quickly. Such an
increase in processing speed would further accord with the idea
that repetition improves the efficiency of neural coding, but speed
of processing was not directly assessed here. It is also possible that
the failure to find an effect on discriminability arose from noise in
the estimates of the difference limen.
Fourth, across participants the difference between the subjective
duration of repeated and novel items was related to the accuracy
of discrimination. Although many ‘‘temporal illusions’’ have been
documented [41] there has been little or no attention to individual
differences in susceptibility to the factors which influence
subjective duration. One possibility is that the more difficult
participants found the discrimination (or the less they engaged
with the task), the more they fell back on the use of non-temporal
information as the basis for their judgments. Human judgment
often involves a strategy of ‘‘attribute substitution’’ in which a
difficult judgment is simplified by substituting a dimension that is
correlated with the target attribute but easier to assess [45]. For
example, the size of the neural response to a stimulus may be
correlated with its physical duration, but will also depend on non-
temporal factors – such as repetition. The magnitude of the neural
response (that is, the coding efficiency) may therefore provide a
reasonable basis for temporal judgment, but one that is susceptible
to distortion if the observer does not attend to other relevant
duration cues – such as the ongoing neural activity evoked by the
other stimuli in the environment. To the extent that an observer is
willing or able to integrate various different indices of duration,
their judgments will be more accurate and less influenced by non-
temporal factors such as repetition. It will be important to see
whether the correlations found here replicate for other factors
which bias duration judgments, such as intensity and modality.
Finally, the data show that the effects of repetition depend upon
the temporal judgment task. In discrimination and category
judgment tasks, repeated stimuli were judged shorter than novel
ones. However, mean temporal productions were longer for novel
stimuli than for repeats (Experiments 3B and 4; this effect was also
replicated in an additional study not reported here). As described
above, it is widely believed that temporal production bears an
inverse relation to subjective duration: manipulations which slow
the accumulation of temporal cues (for example, by reducing the
rate of an internal pacemaker) are expected to shorten the
perceived duration of a given physical interval and to increase the
physical time needed to reach a given subjective duration (e.g.,
[33]) and several previous investigations have reported this
reciprocal pattern [38,39]. However, the dissociation between
judgment and production in Experiments 3A and 3B argue against
acceptance of this relationship as a universal principle.
What mechanism might underlie the finding that mean produc-
tions were longer for novel stimuli than repeats? Experiment 4 found
no evidence that the size of the effect increased with increasing target
duration in the manner predicted by an increase in the rate of an
internal pacemaker. Stimulus repetition may therefore affect other
aspects of the production task. Unlike discrimination and estimations
tasks, temporal production requires that the observer continuously
compare the current duration against a reference memory, with a
match initiating a response which terminates stimulus presentation.
One tentative explanation for the results of Experiments 3B and 4 is
that it takes longer to disengage from viewing novel images in order to
make a response when the target duration has been reached – for
example, because viewing novel stimuli is more interesting than
viewing repeats – leading to longer temporal productions. If there is a
constant ‘‘disengagement latency’’ for novel stimuli, the effect of
repetition on temporal production will be independent of the to-be-
timed duration – as was found in Experiment 4. Such an effect would
be separate from any influence of repetition on subjective duration per
se, and would not affect judgments in discrimination or estimation
tasks like those of Experiments 1, 2, and 3A.
This suggestion is speculative, but the dissociation between
production and estimation/discrimination judgments nonetheless
has important implications. Some studies of time perception –
including research concerned with the effects of prior exposure on
temporal perception – use only the production task to assess
subjective duration [33,44]. However, the current results urge
caution about using temporal production as an index of subjective
duration in this context. Similarly, Droit-Volet has recently
warned about temporal production techniques, emphasizing the
contribution of motor factors to performance [46], and there is
evidence that temporal productions are affected by the events
immediately prior to the production interval [11]. In contrast,
simply asking people how long they think a stimulus lasted has
been described as a the ‘‘rawest’’ type of temporal judgment
[16,47], and may be a better measure. More generally, it is worth
noting the basic point that in the many experiments which seek to
study time perception, the observer’s percept is never directly
observable. All such experiments involve a judgment task, and the
nature of this judgment can shape our inferences about the neural
or algorithmic bases for perception [40].
Methods
Ethics statement
Participants gave written informed consent. Ethical approval for
all experiments was granted by the ethics committee of the
University of Essex Faculty of Science and Engineering.
Stimuli
In all experiments the stimuli were a set of 1200 landscape
photographs (3436245 pixels) drawn from diverse sources such
that participants were very unlikely to have encountered the
images before. A random subset of images was chosen for each
participant. Pictures were presented on 190 CRT monitors
(10246768 pixels, 85 Hz). In Experiment 1 stimuli were presented
against a black background and viewed from approximately 40 cm
in quiet testing rooms (stimuli subtended approximately 17612
degrees visual angle); in the other experiments stimuli were
presented against a white background and viewed from approx-
imately 60 cm through the glass walls of sound attenuating
chambers (stimuli subtended approximately 1168 degrees visual
angle). Responses were made via computer keyboard and stimulus
presentation was controlled by DMDX [48]; occasional trials were
excluded because of display timing errors.
Experiment 1
Fifteen participants took part for course credit or a payment of
£4. On each trial, participants saw two pictures. The first, standard
stimulus was always presented for 506 ms; the second, comparison
stimulus was presented for 306, 353, 400, 447, 506, 565, 612, 659,
or 706 ms (each comparison stimulus occurred equally often;
intervals were chosen to be an integer number of screen refreshes).
After offset of the second picture participants used response keys to
indicate whether the second stimulus was longer or shorter than the
first. The sequence of events on each trial is shown in Figure 1A.
Repetition and Time Perception
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On half of the trials, the same picture was used as both the
standard and comparison stimulus (repeat trials); on the other half,
the comparison picture was different from the standard (novel
trials). Trial order was randomized. Different pictures were used
on every trial. Participants completed 396 trials with the
opportunity to pause every 12 trials.
For each participant, logistic psychometric functions were fit for
each condition and used to calculate the point of subjective
equality and difference limen. Fitting was performed with the lrm
function of the Design package of R [49,50]. One participant was
excluded because the data deviated significantly from the logistic
function, leaving 14 participants.
Experiment 2
Twenty eight new participants completed the experiment for
course credit. The task was similar to Experiment 1. Seven
comparison durations were used (294, 365, 435, 506, 576, 647,
and 718 ms). There were 25 blocks of 21 trials. The standard was
a different randomly-chosen picture on every trial. On novel trials,
the comparison picture was a different image not previously seen
in the experiment; on immediate repetition trials, the comparison
picture was identical to the standard; on delayed repetition trials,
the comparison picture was the standard image shown 21 trials
previously; this could have been a novel trial or a delayed
repetition trial, but never an immediate repetition trial. Thus, the
comparison pictures on both immediate repetition and delayed
repetition trials had both been seen precisely once before, for
506 ms. The sequence of events on each trial was: a randomly-
chosen blank interval for 882–1117 ms; the standard picture for
506 ms; a blank interval for 3061 ms; the comparison picture for
294–718 ms; and a blank interval until the participant responded.
Each block comprised one occurrence of each comparison
duration in each experimental condition, in random order (subject
to the constraint that the delayed repetition trials could not occupy
the position in the block taken by the immediate repetition trials of
the previous block, to ensure that delayed repeat pictures had been
seen only once before.) The first block served as run in; no lag
trials were possible, so there were two sets of novel trials and one
set of immediate repetition trials. Participants were invited to take
a break at the end of each block.
For each participant, logistic functions were fitted to the data
from each condition. For eight participants the data deviated
significantly from the logistic function for one or more of the three
conditions, so these participants were excluded (their inclusion
made no difference to the results).
Experiments 3A and 3B
Forty three new participants took part for a payment of £3;
alternating participants were assigned to the judgment task
(Experiment 3A) and production task (Experiment 3B). One
participant was excluded from the production task for failing to
follow instructions, leaving 22 who completed the categorization
task and 20 who completed the production task.
The sequence of events on each trial of the categorization task
was: blank interval for 882–1059 ms; first stimulus for 506 ms;
blank interval for 306–424 ms; the second stimulus 906, 1000 or
1094 ms; blank interval until response. Seven response buttons were
labelled 0.7–1.3 seconds in 0.1 second steps; participants were told
to press the button corresponding to the duration closest to the
length of time that the second picture was on the screen. On half of
the trials the second stimulus was identical to the first (repetition
condition); on half it was different (novel condition). Each block of
18 trials comprised 3 occurrences of each condition-duration
combination in random order. Participants completed 7 blocks; the
first block was treated as practice and discarded from analysis.
The production task was identical except that the second stimulus
remained on-screen until the participant tapped a key; participants
were told to tap the key after the second picture had displayed for 1
second, and to rely on their intuitive sense of time rather than
counting. Participants completed 7 blocks of 18 trials with 9
repetition and 9 novel trials per block in random order. Productions
shorter than 200 ms or longer than 2500 ms were excluded as
errors; their inclusion did not affect the pattern of significant results.
Experiment 4
Twenty nine new participants took part for course credit or a
payment of £3. Two were excluded (one failed to follow
instructions; one produced extreme responses on more than
20% of trials).
The production task was identical to Experiment 3B. Partici-
pants saw two pictures on each trial; the first image stayed on-
screen for 506 ms and the second remained visible until the
participant pressed a button. There were 5 blocks of 30 trials (15
novel trials and 15 repetition trials in random order). At the start of
each block participants were informed of the target duration for
that block: 0.5, 0.75, 1.0, 1.25, or 1.5 seconds. Block order was
random and there were no practice trials. Responses shorter than
150 ms or longer than 4000 ms were excluded; their inclusion did
not affect the pattern of significant results.
The production task was immediately followed by a surprise
old-new recognition test. Twenty five ‘‘Old’’ pictures (encountered
during the production task) were randomly intermixed with 25
‘‘New’’ pictures which had not been seen before. Participants
made button presses to indicate whether or not each picture had
been seen earlier in the experiment. The Old pictures were always
items which had been shown as the first member of each pair on
non-repetition trials of the production task. Thus, they were
images which had been seen exactly once for 506 ms. Participants
were not told in advance that they would complete a memory test,
and Old pictures were never drawn from the final block of the
production task, ensuring a substantial lag between ‘‘study’’ and
‘‘test’’. The set of Old pictures was randomly determined for each
participant. The events on each trial were: blank screen for 882–
1059 ms; stimulus for 506 ms, blank screen until response.
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